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ABSTRACT
We study the large observed changes in labor supply by married women in the United States over 1950—1990,
a period when labor supply by single women has hardly changed at all. We investigate the eﬀects of changes
in the gender wage gap, technological improvements in the production of nonmarket goods and potential
inferiority of these goods on understanding this change. We ﬁnd that small decreases in the gender wage
gap can explain simultaneously the signiﬁcant increases in the average hours worked by married women and
t h er e l a t i v ec o n s t a n c yi nt h eh o u r sw o r k e db ys i ngle women, and single and married men. We also ﬁnd that
technological improvements in the household have–for realistic values–too small an impact on married
female hours and the relative wage of females to males. Some speciﬁcations of the inferiority of home goods
match the hours patterns, but have counterfactual predictions for wages and expenditure patterns.
∗We thank Elizabeth Caucutt, Nezih Guner, John Kennan, Derek Neal, Ananth Seshadri, and Michele Tertilt for
useful discussions and the National Science Foundation for ﬁnancial support. The views expressed herein are those
of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.1. Introduction
In the last ﬁfty years, there have been dramatic changes in the United States in the hours
allocated to market production as a function of sex and marital status. The most striking change
is the almost threefold increase in the hours worked by married women. This has occurred over a
period in which married men’s hours have declined slightly and those of single individuals, both
women and men, have been virtually unchanged. (See Figure 1A.) Our objective in this paper is
to study the validity of three alternative hypotheses for why these changes have occurred: i)t h a t
the changes are a result of improvements in the technology for producing home goods, ii)t h a tt h e y
follow from overall income growth if home goods are inferior, and iii)t h a tt h e ya r ear e s u l to fa
reduction in the gender wage gap.
To this end, we construct a dynamic general equilibrium model of the macroeconomy that
diﬀers only minimally from standard models with home production and savings. (See Benhabib,
Rogerson and Wright (1991) and McGrattan, Rogerson and Wright (1997).) These changes include
the explicit distinction between single (both female and male) and married households (and the
women and men in such a household) and speciﬁc decisions about human capital accumulation. All
agents care about both home and market goods as well as the leisure of the parties in the household.
We assume that both home and market goods require quality adjusted labor (time augmented with
human capital) to be produced. These agents interact, as price takers, in aggregate markets for
labor, capital, investment and market consumption.
Using this model, we examine the validity of the three hypotheses for the changes in hours
of work. We ﬁnd that a reduction in the gender wage gap is the most successful of the three. Our
results show that improvements in home technologies are not successful in accounting for the data.
Some extreme forms of home good inferiority (satiation) do have limited success, but these forms
bring with them a host of other, counterfactual, predictions.
We show that for technology to have some impact on market hours, home and market
goods must be either highly substitutable or highly complementary. Otherwise, a change in home
technologies aﬀects only the level of home consumption. If home and market goods are substitutes,
1as McGrattan, Rogerson, and Wright (1997) and Rupert, Rogerson, and Wright (2000) estimate,
then improvements in home technologies actually cause market hours by married women to decrease
rather than increase. The reason is simple: if a married woman can produce substitute goods more
eﬃciently at home, then more time is spent in home production. If home and market goods
are complementary, then hours increase with improvements in home technologies. Even in this
case, and even if we take the most extreme favorable version of the story, that the technological
improvements are modeled as reductions in prices of home capital goods (durables and structures),
only small labor supply eﬀects occur. We ﬁnd similar diﬃculties with alternative approaches to
modeling improvements in home technologies. Home and market goods must be complements,
and the improvements must be very large (on the order of a ﬁvefold increase over the period we
study) and general, not limited to the pricing of durable goods. Even with this, the human capital
response and resulting increase in women’s wages fall short of what are seen in the data.
If, however, we assume that home-produced goods are inferior, we ﬁnd that the pattern of
hours changes seen in the data can be reproduced but only with an extreme version of inferiority—
satiation. Moreover, only certain forms of satiation (i.e., the timing of who gets satiated when) will
simultaneously generate the observed changes by married couples with no change in the behavior
of singles. Nevertheless, this approach has diﬃculties in matching both the observed changes in
the gender wage gap and the relative constancy of consumer durables, broadly deﬁned, purchases
as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP).
In contrast, changes in the gender wage gap perform quite well along a variety of dimensions.
(See Figure 1B for the time series of wages of women relative to those of men.) First, for single
women, changes in this gap are similar to changes in the overall level of wages, and these have
small impacts on labor supply if there is a balanced growth path. This same change implies a large
response by married women because they face a diﬀerent technology set. Married couples–unlike
single individuals–can choose to specialize. In our model, the presence of the gender wage gap
causes married women to allocate a substantial fraction of their time to home production. Thus,
even small changes in the female-male wage gap can generate large labor supply responses. Of
course, as the allocation of time to market activities by married women increases, the elasticity
2of response decreases. Thus, in this sense, the model delivers a theory of why married and single
women display a diﬀerent response to changes in wages and a theory of the time-varying nature of
these elasticities.
Changes in the gender wage gap also have implications for human capital investment. Since
married couples can partially circumvent the implicit tax on women’s labor associated with the
existence of a wage gap by increasing the market hours of men and decreasing the market hours
of women, married women accumulate less human capital than either single women or single men.
Thus, even if they work in the market, married women appear less productive. In response to an
increase in relative wages, the optimal–from a private point of view–degree of specialization in
home production decreases, and married women respond by increasing their investment in human
capital. In the absence of accumulation, their response would be immediate and would lead to
a narrowing of wage diﬀerentials, which would be inconsistent with the data. This increase by
women in investment in human capital is also consistent with the relative increase in educational
attainment by women over the last 30 years.
We conduct sensitivity analyses of our results and ﬁnd that they are robust to changes in
the details about the type of human capital that is included, the bargaining power of women in a
household, and who it is that beneﬁts from the existence of the wage gap. Roughly speaking, as
long as the change in the sex-speciﬁc component of wages is comparable to the amount seen in the
data, the response by married women matches the U.S. evidence. If this change is not sex-speciﬁc
(that is, it applies to either all individuals or only to married women), the observations cannot be
matched by the model.
Throughout, we model the gender wage gap as made up of two distinct pieces, one exoge-
nous and the other endogenous. First, the exogenous element is modeled as sex speciﬁc tax rates
which are higher for females than for males. Second, in part due to the diﬀerences by sex in tax
rates, endogenous accumulation decisions vary by sex and marital status, and this also contributes
to diﬀerences in measured wages. It is the ﬁrst (exogenous) component that we change in our
experiments. Although we do not model the details directly, this approach is consistent with the
3view that the wage gap (i.e., the sex speciﬁc tax component) is a consequence of discrimination,
either directly in wages or through the presence of a “glass-ceiling.” Viewed in this light, our re-
sults show that even small changes in discrimination over time (on the order of a 6% fall in the tax
rate in our benchmark parameterization) give rise to the type of hours changes actually observed
in the United States since 1950. This could be the result of changes in regulations relating to
discriminatory practices or changes in the fundamentals that allow discrimination to appear as an
equilibrium phenomenon. (See Becker (1971) and Coate and Loury (1993).) Our ﬁndings are also
consistent with the view that the change to the exogenous component of the gender wage gap is due
to sex-speciﬁc productivity changes. For example, the wide-scale use of electric motors decreases
the importance of physical strength and thus, while increasing the productivity of both women and
men, the increase is greater for women. Finally, our approach does not rule out the possibility that
some other change (for example, changes in divorce laws) is driving the observed change in the
gender wage gap through its indirect eﬀects on the incentives to invest in unobserved components
of human capital.
The results we obtain on the eﬀects of improvements in home technologies are substantially
diﬀerent from those of Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu (2002). Their model focuses on sub-
stitution at the extensive margin (married women either work or not), but also features satiation
in home production. Their model performs well in that a calibrated decrease in the price of house-
hold durables results in a substantial increase in married women’s labor force participation. Our
approach, which assumes smooth substitution, allows us to disentangle the eﬀects of technological
improvements from those of satiation. Our ﬁndings suggest that it is the assumption of satiation
that is important for the positive results of Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu, not technological
improvements per se. Their model also predicts a substantial decrease in married women’s labor
force participation at some point and has the implication that the share of income spent on home
durables is ultimately declining. Neither of these predictions matches the data. Finally, they do
not consider the eﬀects of the technological change on single individuals.
At the micro level, the pioneering work by Mincer (1962) was a ﬁrst attempt to explain
changes in the amount of women’s work as driven by the overall increase in wages using a static
4framework. Using the same principles, but considerably more sophisticated statistical analysis,
Smith and Ward (1985) study a model that predicts an increase equal to 58% of the observed
change for the period 1950—80, but as they acknowledge, their model would run into particular
trouble in the 1980s and 1990s when real wage growth was low but women’s labor force participation
increased. Blau (1998, p. 126) states that “a considerable portion of the change over time in female
participation remains ‘unexplained’ by variables conventionally used in our analyses.” Goldin
(1990) ﬁnds that cohort (or time) eﬀects are more important than standard economic variables.
In general, these studies treat married and single women separately and summarize their diﬀerent
response to the same change in wages by indicating that the two groups have diﬀerent elasticities.
In some sense we propose a theory of why the elasticities of women’s labor supply are so diﬀerent
across marital status and why they have changed so much over time. (The theory may help explain
why time and cohort eﬀects have considerable explanatory value.)
Several other fully speciﬁed quantitative general equilibrium models have been developed
to explain several issues that are related to the economics of the family. We discuss the handful
that deal with the issue of women’s labor supply. Greenwood, Guner, and Knowles (2000 and
forthcoming) study a model with endogenous fertility. The model is very successful in replicating
the experience of welfare mothers and their children and provides provocative answers to changes
in several features of the welfare system. However, from the perspective of female labor supply, the
model does not perform well. It predicts that the hours worked by married women exceed those
of single women by 37% and that single women work only 60% of the hours worked by single men.
Both these implications are at odds with the U.S. evidence. (See Greenwood, Guner, and Knowles
(forthcoming).)
Olivetti (2001) and Caucutt, Guner, and Knowles (2002) investigate the impact of a sex-
speciﬁc increase in the returns to experience. Olivetti studies a four-period model in which human
capital can only be acquired through working. Her model succeeds in predicting an increase in mar-
ried women’s market hours. However, from her formulation–and in this she follows the traditional
labor literature–the same eﬀects would also have a positive impact on the number of hours worked
by single women, and it is diﬃcult to evaluate the impact that diﬀerential returns to experience
5had in the 1950s, when married women’s labor force participation became more signiﬁcant quan-
titatively. Caucutt, Guner, and Knowles also predict that increases in the returns to experience
have a large impact on the hours supplied by single women. In addition, neither paper presents
any direct evidence of a sex-speciﬁcc h a n g ei nt h et e c h n o l o g yt h a tt h e yu s et od e s c r i b el e a r n i n go n
the job.
In Section 2, we present a simple static example illustrating the eﬀects we capture with the
full model. In Section 3, we introduce the full dynamic model, and in Section 4, we present some
of the basic facts that we will use to evaluate alternative hypotheses. In Sections 5, 6 and 7, we
study, in turn, the quantitative impacts of improvements in the home technology, the properties of
equilibrium when home production is inferior, and the eﬀects of changes in wage discrimination.
O u rr e s u l t sa r es u m m a r i z e di nS e c t i o n8 .
2. A Simple Static Example
In this section, we lay out a simple static example of labor supply choice in order to build
intuition for the results which are coming below. We show that in a standard model of home
production, the labor supply decisions of single women, single men, and married couples are inde-
pendent of changes in the level of technology in both the home and market sectors. These decisions
are also shown to be independent of the price of any durable goods used to produce the home good.
The labor supply decisions of single individuals are also shown to be independent of any factors
giving rise to diﬀerences in after-tax wages between women and men. However, changes in these
factors do have an eﬀect on market hours of married women and men. Throughout this section, we
w i l la s s u m et h es o u r c eo ft h ed i ﬀerences is wage discrimination and model it as sex-speciﬁcl a b o r
tax rates.
Consider a setting in which all households–single women, single men, and married couples–
must decide how to allocate their labor endowments across market activities and the production
of goods in the home and how much of their income to allocate to consumption goods and home
capital goods. Home production requires the use of both hours and these capital goods. All
households face a common set of technological restrictions (productivities), and each is taxed on
6labor income earned in the market sector. Because we will later model discrimination as tax wedges
which diﬀer by sex, we introduce this feature here. In order to simplify the analysis, we assume
that all households are identical except for marital status.
Single Households
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where the subjects f and s indicate female and single, c1
fs and c2
fs are consumption of the market
and home goods,  1
fs and  2
fs are hours worked in the market and the home, kfs is the amount of
the home-speciﬁc capital good purchased, q is its price, w i st h ew a g er a t e ,A is a home-speciﬁc
productivity factor, and τf is the wedge between actual productivity and income for the typical
female.1
The maximization problem for single men–identiﬁed with the subscript m instead of f–is
similar, with the only diﬀerence being in the tax rate faced. As noted above, we will assume that
1−τf =( 1−τd)(1−τm), where τm represents the common labor income tax rate and τd represents
the additional wedge faced by a female when there is discrimination in the market activity. This
wedge is a proxy for either direct wage discrimination, a women being paid less than her marginal
product, or the shadow value on a constraint restricting a woman’s job opportunities, e.g., a glass
ceiling. (See the Appendix for a model with a glass-ceiling policy.)
It is straightforward to generalize the problem to allow for sex-speciﬁcd i ﬀerences in pro-
ductivities, allowing for a rich variety of potential diﬀerences in both absolute advantage and
comparative advantage across the sexes. Since this will not change any of the results given below,
7we leave this generalization to the reader.
Let Wfs =( 1− τf)w. Then the solution to the single woman’s problem is
 1
fs = µ + θν,
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Thus, as is standard in problems with log utility, expenditure shares on the diﬀerent goods (market
consumption, home consumption, and leisure) are constant fractions of wealth, Wfs.I nt h i sc a s e ,
this implies that the expenditure on home investment goods is also a constant fraction of wealth
and that time spent in the home is independent of prices. A similar set of equations holds for single
men, with the only diﬀerence being that τm appears everywhere in place of τf.O t h e r w i s e , t h e
solutions are identical.
Clearly, these equations show that hours used in both the market and the home are indepen-
dent of w, A, q, and 1 −τ. These parameters do have an impact on both the level of consumption
and the amount of the home capital good purchased. Thus, improvements in technologies do not
alter the amount of labor supplied to the market by either single women or single men. Also,
the market labor supply of single women and single men will be the same even if women face an
additional tax wedge due to discrimination.2
In a dynamic setting in which w and A are endogenously determined by human capital
formation decisions which may diﬀer across the sexes (due to either discrimination or natural
productivity diﬀerences), analogs of these static ﬁrst-order conditions will still apply, and hence,
much of this reasoning will continue to hold. The main diﬀerence is that the levels of consumption
and labor supply will enter the optimality conditions governing optimal capital accumulation, and
hence, the eﬀects will be more complex.
8If the utility functions of the two sexes are identical, but are not logarithmic, the results given
above need no longer hold. How they are changed depends on the elasticity of substitution between
home and market goods. For example, if the utility function aggregates home and market goods
using a CES aggregator, and home and market goods are substitutes, an increase in productivity
i nt h eh o m e( A) causes both single women and single men to consume more home production and
fewer market hours. If the goods are complements, the opposite occurs, causing market hours to
increase for both sexes. Similarly, the eﬀects of diﬀerences in sex-speciﬁc tax rates depends on
whether home and market goods are substitutes or complements. For example, if home and market
goods are substitutes, and women face higher eﬀective tax rates than men, single women’s hours
s u p p l i e dt ot h em a r k e tw i l lb el o w e rt h a nt h o s eo fs i n g l em e n . C o r r e s p o n d i n g l y ,s i n g l ew o m e n
will consume more home goods and fewer market goods than their male counterparts. This may
a c c o u n tf o rt h es m a l lb u tm e a s u r a b l ed i ﬀerence in market hours between single women and single
men seen in the data. (Single women work slightly less than single men do, and this diﬀerence
has been relatively stable over time.) Of course, the size of these eﬀects will depend both on the
changes in relative productivities of the two activities (or the change in sex-speciﬁc tax rates) and
on the degree to which preferences depart from the log speciﬁcation.
Married Couples
We turn now to the problem of a married couple, or partnership, in this environment. We
assume that the bargaining problem within the household is resolved eﬃciently, so that a weighted
form of a planner’s problem describes the decisions that the couple makes. For such a partnership,
then, the maximization problem solved is
max λf[µlog(c1
fp)+ν log(c2
fp)+( 1− µ − ν)log( fp)]
+λm[µlog(c1
mp)+ν log(c2
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9 fp+  1
fp+  2
fp =1 ,
 mp +  1
mp +  2
mp =1 ,
where the subscript p indicates partnership, c1
fp and c1
mp are the consumption of the market good
by the woman and the man of the pair, c2
fp and c2
mp are their consumption levels of the home good,
 1
fp and  1
mp are the hours they work in the market, and  2
fp and  2
mp are the hours they work in the
home. The remainder of the parameters are as discussed above. Note that we have maintained the
assumption that tax rates are sex-speciﬁca n dw i l l ,a sa b o v e ,i n t e r p r e td i ﬀerences between τf and
τm as due to the eﬀects of discrimination in the market activity.
Here, as in Becker’s (1991) work, the solution to this problem is not interior in general since
men’s and women’s hours are perfect substitutes in both home and market activities. Because of
this, there will be specialization within the household. In keeping with what is seen in the data,
we will use the ﬁrst order conditions that result when  2
mp = 0, but will assume that otherwise the
solution to the problem is interior.
The solution to the married couple’s problem is
 1














where Wp ≡ (1 − τf)w +( 1− τm)w. We have also assumed, for simplicity, that there are no
economies of scale in living as a couple. This could be reﬂe c t e di nt h ee x a m p l ei nav a r i e t yo fw a y s ,
but would not aﬀect the results below.
For married as for single households, changes in A, q,a n dw do not aﬀect the household’s
allocation of hours to any of the activities–leisure, work in the home, or work in the market. As is
the case with single agents, there are changes in quantities consumed and in k, however. The form
of these quantity adjustments mirrors that for the single agents and will not be included here.
10The same is not true for changes in taxes. If either τm or τf is changed, with the other
held ﬁxed, then hours adjust. For example, if τm is unchanged, but τf falls, or, equivalently,
discrimination is reduced, so that τd falls, it follows that  1
fp increases while  2
fp falls (as does  fp)–
the woman works more in the market and less in the home (and consumes less leisure). At the same
time,  1
mp falls (and  mp goes up). Thus, in response to a reduction in market discrimination, the
woman works more in the market; the man works less. In contrast, if τm and τf are both changed
proportionally with 1 − τd =( 1− τf)/(1 − τm) ﬁxed, there is no change in hours.
In sum, we see that if utility is logarithmic, changes in technology are neutral for labor
supply decisions for both singles and married couples, whereas reductions in discrimination leave the
decisions of singles unchanged but increase married women’s market hours. For utility speciﬁcations
diﬀering from logarithmic, there will be eﬀects on all agents of changes in technology, even if
preferences are homothetic, but the direction of the eﬀects will depend on the substitutability
between home and market goods. By continuity, the eﬀects are likely to be small unless the
changes are very large or the utility structure deviates greatly from unit elasticity of substitution.
In this case, the eﬀects will be present for all agents, single and married, women and men.
Inferiority of the Home Good
There will also be eﬀects of technological change on labor supply if preferences are not
homothetic. Since these changes are substantial for some speciﬁcations when home goods are
inferior, we present a simple version of this phenomenon here. We consider a perturbation on the
model above in which households become satiated in c2 once it is equal to c∗.B e y o n d t h a t , t h e
formulation is identical.
We restrict attention to the problem of a single household. Of course, if parameters are such
that the solution to the original problem satisﬁes c2
fs ≤ c∗, the solution is that presented above.
This will hold as long as A[θν(1 − τf)w/q]
θ [(1 − θ)ν]
1−θ ≤ c∗. This requires a relatively low A, w,
and 1 −τf and a relatively high q. If this does not hold, the solution is given by c2
fs = c∗ with kfs
and  2
sf chosen to minimize the cost of producing c∗.L e tC (c∗;q,(1 − τf)w) denote the minimum
total cost of producing c2
fs = c∗.
11The solution to the household optimization problem is
 1
fs =











































In this case, increases in w and decreases in τf decrease  2
fs, but increase  fs.W h e t h e r 1
fs increases
or decreases depends on which is larger, 1 − θ or (1 − µ − ν)/(1 − ν). If 1 − θ is larger,  1
fs rises
with increases in (1 − τf)w while the opposite holds if 1 − θ is smaller. Similar results hold for
changes in both A and q;i f1− θ is larger than (1 − µ − ν)/(1 − ν), increases in A and decreases
in q increase  1
fs. Thus, as is intuitive, what is important is the share of   in the production of c2
relative to its share in the reduced form utility, (1 − µ − ν)/(1 − ν).
Thus, in some cases, satiation gives an alternative route to changes in  1
fs,b u ta sw ec a n
see from the example, this eﬀect is present in single households as well as those of married couples.
N o t e ,h o w e v e r ,t h a ta sA or w rises, or q falls, qk falls as a fraction of income.
Although the example we have considered in this section is special, the qualitative nature
of the results can be generalized considerably. For example, including quality choices for home
production (cf. Mokyr 2000) and the presence of glass ceilings for women does not change the
conclusions.
3. A General Dynamic Model
In this section we describe a general, aggregate model. We follow Benhabib, Rogerson, and
Wright (1991) and Greenwood and Hercowitz (1991) by assuming that households both produce
g o o d si nt h eh o m ea n dw o r ki nt h em a r k e t .W ed i ﬀer from their analysis by explicitly considering
12consumption and labor supply of the two partners within a married couple.
We abstract from issues of marriage and divorce and assume that married couples solve their
internal bargaining problem eﬃciently. Thus, we model the decisions made by individual members


























[(1 − τkt)rt + δkτkt]k1
pt +( 1− τ ft)wtz1












pt+1 ≤ [(1 − δk)ki
pt + xi
kpt]/(1 + γp),i =1 ,2
hgpt+1 ≤ [(1 − δh)hgpt + xhgpt]/(1 + γp),g = f,m,
ηgpt+1 ≤ [(1 − δη)ηgpt + xηgpt]/(1 + γp),g = f,m,
zi
gpt ≤ Φi( i
gpt,h gpt,ηgpt),i =1 ,2,g= f,m,
 gpt =1−  1
gpt −  2
gpt,g = f,m,
where we follow the same notational convention as in the previous section.
For simplicity, we abstract from any economies of scale at the household level, but note
that married households do have some beneﬁt directly from the possibility of specialization. The
terms zi
gpt indicate the eﬀective amount of labor allocated to sector i (1 if market, 2 if nonmarket)
by an individual of gender g (f or m) who is in a partnership (again, indicated by p)i nt i m e
period t.W ea l l o we ﬀective labor to depend on raw hours,  i
gpt, and two forms of human capital,
hgpt and ηgpt. The corresponding investments in human capital are xhgpt and xηgpt. The function
mapping, Φ, hours and human capital into eﬀective labor is indexed by the type of activity. This
13speciﬁcation allows for diﬀerent skills for the production of market goods and nonmarket goods
(computer programming versus child rearing). In addition, it allows us to consider the eﬀects of
diﬀerential productivity between females and males in the production of some goods. We denote
by ki
pt the amount of capital devoted to activity i, i =1 ,2. Note that these should be thought of as
broad measures of capital goods, for example, including all appliances, autos, and the house itself
in the production of the home good. Corresponding to this, we want to allow for the relative prices
o fh o m ec a p i t a lg o o d st of a l lo v e rt i m e ;s oqt denotes the relative price of a home capital good in
period t.T h ep r i c eo fc o n s u m p t i o n i n p e r i o d t is given by pt. The real wage rate is wt,a n dt h e
rental rate is rt. Finally, γp is the rate of population growth, and Tpt is transfers.3
The terms τ gt capture, as before, tax rates on labor services of a married individual of
gender g. In this aggregate model, this wedge between women’s and men’s wages is meant to
capture both outright discrimination and other factors (e.g., marriage bars, career tracking, glass
ceilings, changes in the shadow price of characteristics) that result in lower eﬀective wages for
women. This is important because it is the after-tax wage rate that will determine the payoﬀ
to investment in human capital. There are substantial diﬀerences between the raw wage gap–
which is our driving shock–and the adjusted wage gap, which corresponds to what is measured
in the data. The latter includes not only the diﬀerences captured by (1 − τ ft)/(1 − τ mt), but
also other diﬀerences in characteristics (human capital), both measured and unmeasured that–
although endogenous–vary systematically across groups. We assume that labor tax rates do not
depend on marital status.
The problem solved by single women (indicated by the subscript fs) and single men (with
subscript ms) are similar to (2), with the obvious changes.
Let ngs be the number (fraction) of individuals of gender g (f or m) who are single, and let
np be the number (fraction) of partnerships. For simplicity, we will assume that these do not change











the aggregate supply of eﬀective labor.
14We assume that there is a constant returns to scale aggregate production function of market
goods given by A1
tF1(¯ k1
t, ¯ z1
t). Unless otherwise speciﬁed, we assume that both A1
t and A2
t grow at
















where Gt denotes government spending on goods and services. We assume that Gt is a constant
fraction of market output.
Definition. An equilibrium is a collection of prices [{pt},{rt},{wt}] and an allocation (deﬁned as
all quantities indexed by type of good, sex, and marital status) for which
1. Given prices, the allocation solves (2), and the equivalent problems for singles.
2. The allocation is feasible.
The model we just outlined is too complex to derive interesting quantitative results theoret-
ically. In order to make some progress in understanding the eﬀects of changes in technology and
wage discrimination, we use standard numerical techniques to compute equilibrium allocations.
Functional Forms and Parameter Choices
We start with the speciﬁcation of the functional forms we will use in our quantitative analysis.





ψ1(c1)ψ2 +( 1− ψ1)(c2)ψ2
´(1−ψ3)/ψ2 (1 −  1 −  2)ψ3
¸1−σ
.
T h ep r o d u c t i o nf u n c t i o no fb o t ht y p e so fg o o d s( m a r k e ta n dn o n m a r k e t )a r ea s s u m e dt ob eC o b b -
Douglas, with the same coeﬃcients for market and nonmarket goods: Fi(k,z)=Aikθz1−θ,i=1 ,2.
We assume that the production functions of speciﬁc human capital are identical across all categories
15(sex and marital status) and are given by Φi(h,η, i)=( h)κi(η)ζi i,i =1 ,2.
The parameter choices for our benchmark case are in Table 1. We set np to match the fact
that roughly 60% of the relevant U.S. population was married during the period we study. Values
for government spending and tax rates on labor and capital are average U.S. postwar values. The
annual growth rates γp and γA are long-run U.S. trend levels. The discount factor is chosen so that
the trend interest rate is 4%.
Values for the capital share, θ, the rate of physical depreciation, δk, and two critical pref-
erence parameters, ψ2 and σ, are the maximum likelihood estimates of McGrattan, Rogerson, and
Wright (1997) for a model with home production. We set the depreciation rates for human capital,
δh and δη, equal to the depreciation rate for physical capital, δk, for our benchmark example. Since
good estimates for human capital rates are not readily available, these parameter choices will be
one focus of our sensitivity analysis.
We choose the remaining preference parameters (ψ1,ψ3,λ f), two of the elasticities for ef-
fective labor (κ1,κ 2), and the paths of technology and discrimination taxes to achieve several
objectives. First, with no change in technology or discrimination, we want the benchmark parame-
ters to yield initial hours of work that match the 1950 hours in Figure 1A for three groups–married
women, married men, and single women–and to yield a relative wage of 51%–which is the value
we obtain from extrapolating back the time series in Figure 1B.4 Second, we assume that the initial
leisure of married men is equal to the initial leisure of married women. This determines a value
for the weight on married women’s utility, λf. This weight turns out to be very low, only 0.062.
Because this value is so low, it will be one of the parameters that we focus on when we do sensitivity
analysis.
A third objective is to match the U.S. time series on relative wages (Figure 1B) in the
benchmark simulation with a change in discrimination. To do this and achieve the initial conditions
above, we set the initial discrimination tax, τd1950, at 22% and set subsequent rates so that the
model yields the same time path for relative wages as in Figure 1B.
For the benchmark parameterization, we do not distinguish between type-h and type-η
16human capital; therefore, we assume that κi = ζi in both sectors, i =1 ,2. We experiment later by
assuming no human capital and assuming sector-speciﬁch u m a nc a p i t a l . 5
We assume that the government purchases 20% of market goods and services and redis-
tributes, in a lump-sum fashion, any remaining revenue generated. We interpret τ mt as the gov-
ernmentally speciﬁed tax rate on labor income and assume that any diﬀerence due to discrimination
is completely used for redistributive purposes. For simplicity, we assume that this redistribution
is equally divided among all agents in the economy. This is consistent with our assumption that
although we have modeled discrimination as a tax, it is not being used for revenue generation.
Later, we look at alternative speciﬁcations of the distribution of revenue.
Finally, since we want to abstract from business cycle frequency eﬀe c t s ,w et a k eat i m ep e r i o d
in our model to be ﬁve years. Thus, t = 0 corresponds to the year 1950, and t = 10 corresponds
to the year 2000. The calculations that we perform assume that all agents perfectly anticipate the
changes that are forthcoming.
For each experiment, we include sensitivity analyses on our results. The parameters used
for these alternatives are included in Table 2.
4. Background Data
In this section we outline the basic facts about (i) U.S. labor supplies, (ii) relative wage
rates, (iii) home capital goods prices, and (iv) home capital shares that we will compare our model
solutions to.
The changes in the levels and composition of hours allocated to market production by sex
and marital status that have occurred since 1950 are notable. The most striking facts are that the
average number of hours worked by married women has increased 171% from 8.17 to 22.66 hours
per week; the average number of hours worked by married men has decreased from 41.28 to 38.30
(−8%). In contrast to this, the average number of hours worked by single individuals–both women
and men–has been relatively stable, with single men working slightly more than single women.
Both are at a level approximately equal to 70% of those worked by married men, and hours for
17single men show a small decrease over the 40-year period covered in the data, about −4% in total,
from 31.58 to 30.24. For single women, the levels were 28.99 hours per week in 1950 and 29.00
in 1990. Finally, we can see that there has been a change in the relative composition of hours
by a married couple, with the sum looking more and more like the sum of a single woman and a
single man over the period (based on the average for those aged 25—64 years. More precisely, an
artiﬁcial household formed by two single individuals worked approximately 60.5 hours per week
in 1950, and about 59.2 hours per week in 1990. On the other hand, the average married couple
worked approximately 49.5 hours per week in 1950, but almost 61.0 hours per week in 1990. (See
McGrattan and Rogerson (1998).) These are the observations that we want the model to match as
outputs.
The evidence on the size and nature of the gender wage gap has been well-documented. (See
Goldin (1990, 1997).) For example, Blau (1998) ﬁnds that women working full-time earned about
56% of what men earned in 1969 and that this ratio was relatively ﬂat until the mid 1970s and
then rose to about 72% by 1994. The same pattern is seen for high-school graduates and college
graduates. The gender wage gap is a diﬃcult measure to interpret. In principle, it can measure
either the direct eﬀects of wage discrimination (the payment of lower wages to one group despite
equivalent training and work duties) or diﬀerences in unmeasured (by the econometrician) skills
that are correlated with sex. These diﬀerences in skills themselves could be due to discrimination
(e.g., glass ceilings and marriage bars; see Goldin (1990)) or due to other, non-discriminatory,
incentives for the development of skills across the sexes (e.g., specialization in the provision of
home goods and child care).
We model the gender wage gap as arising from two distinct sources. The ﬁrst is wage
discrimination in employment, which we model as a sex-speciﬁc tax. This modeling choice is
similar to the formulation implied by the Becker (1971) approach to discrimination and can also be
interpreted as the shadow price on sex-speciﬁc constraints on job types (e.g., marriage bars or glass
ceilings). The second source of wage diﬀerences in the model is diﬀerences, by sex, in skills (i.e.,
human capital). Diﬀerences by sex in the attainment of these skills are endogenous to the model.
The forces driving these diﬀerences are partly due to discrimination and partly due to specialization
18within a married couple. For us then, the lessening of the gender wage gap seen in the data comes
from a reduction in this sex-speciﬁc tax rate.
It is diﬃcult to know exactly the magnitude of the discrimination tax or how much it has
changed, but Goldin (1990) carefully documents several discriminatory practices and the begin-
ning of their decline in the 1950s. Other relevant considerations include the passage of the 19th
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in 1920 giving women the right to vote, the introduction of
speciﬁc federal regulations against discrimination by sex (for example, the creation of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission; see Goldin (1990)), which would have an eﬀect on wage
payments by sex in either the Becker (1971) or the Coate and Loury (1993) models of discrimina-
tion, and the reduction in union power over the period, which would reduce the amount of eﬀective
discrimination in the Becker (1971) model. Since we know of no direct measures of the size of the
relevant tax rate, we will do considerable experimentation below.
Direct measures of changes in productivity in the home are not easy to come by either. In
the special case that increased productivity is realized as cheaper home capital, one part of the
evidence is carefully discussed by Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu (2002). They document
that the real price of household appliances decreased at an annual rate between 3.5% and 8.0%
starting in 1950. They ignore other important categories of home capital, however. Some of these,
such as autos, are also important timesaving durables used in home production and have had less
dramatic price reductions. Housing itself has had virtually no real price reduction.
Figure 2A shows the time series of price deﬂators from the U.S. national income and product
accounts (NIPA) for both a broad and a narrow measure of home capital. Durable consumption
and residential investment together represent about 12% of GDP on average over the 1929—2000
period, and the price deﬂator for this category shows a slight decline over the period, but it is not
substantial. The other, more narrowly deﬁned, category of household appliances represents about
0.7% of GDP on average over the 1929—2000 period and shows a marked decrease in prices over
the period, with its value in 1990 about 23% of that in 1950.
Figure 2B shows the time series of expenditure shares for these two categories. The ex-
19penditure share for the durable consumption and residential investment category shows very little
change over the period but moves systematically with the cycle. After a short post—WWII boom,
the expenditure share of household appliances drops quickly, returns to its prewar level, then shows
a slow gradual decline over the next 35 years.
5. Technological Change in the Home
In this section we study the impact of changes in technology on the allocation of labor
by singles and partnerships. There are many ways one could, in principle, study the eﬀects of
technological change in the model outlined above. This could be done by having sector speciﬁc
growth rates in market and home activities, for example. Although we do discuss this alternative
in the section on sensitivity below, it is problematic in that there is no direct measurement of the
rate of technological change in the home sector. Thus, we focus ﬁrst on the eﬀect discussed by
Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu (2002), that the price of durables in the home sector has
fallen over the period we are studying.6 Corresponding to this, we ask, What is the equilibrium
eﬀect of reductions in q in the budget constraint of the individual households?
A popular explanation of the increase in hours allocated to market work is that improvements
in household durables and in the availability of ready-made goods (clothes, foodstuﬀs) free up time
from housework. From a theoretical point of view this is not necessarily the case as was shown
in Section 2. Increases in productivity can increase or decrease the hours allocated to housework
depending on the elasticity of substitution between home and market goods. From an empirical
perspective the evidence is mixed. Historians of technology (e.g., Cowan (1983)) argue–using
evidence from a number of time-use data studies–that substantial increases in the productivity of
labor allocated to home production did not result in decreases in the number of hours of housework,
especially during the 1870—1940 period, which may have seen the largest productivity increases.
The unchanging home work hours, despite increased productivity, could have occurred because
of increases in the quantity or the quality of home good production (washing clothes more often,
cleaning house more thoroughly, for example) or from changes in demands for doing this work,
such as moving to the suburbs or purchasing a larger house. Economic historians, such as Mokyr
20(2000), agree with the facts presented by Cowan, but diﬀer in the interpretation. Mokyr (2000)
argues that several scientiﬁc revolutions have induced households to spend more time in housework
in order to increase the quality of home production. Finally, Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu
(2002) argue that the diﬀusion of household durables can account for the increase in women’s labor
force participation.
To give this explanation the best chance for success, we use the same change in q as that
used by Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu, that given by appliance prices, a reduction of 77%
over the 1950—1990 period. As noted above, this is a much more dramatic reduction in prices than
what is seen in other household durables (autos and houses themselves, for example) and is similar
in magnitude to the reduction of some narrowly deﬁned classes of producer durables.
Results
The results of our computations are shown in Figure 3. As noted above, the best estimates
are that home and market goods are substitutes, but in this case, a reduction in q actually causes
married women’s market hours to fall, in contrast to what is seen in the data. Because of this, we
focus on examples where home and market goods are complements.
The hours series for one of these examples (with ψ2 = −.75) is shown in Figure 3A. As
c a nb es e e nf r o mt h eﬁgure, the experiment is successful for single households; the hours of both
single women and single men are unchanged in response to the price reduction. The experiment is
not successful for married households, however. There is a measurable eﬀect on married women’s
market hours, but it is much smaller than the increase in hours seen in the data. Similarly, the
change in married men’s hours is hardly noticeable, again in contrast to what is seen in the data.
Even though human capital is allowed to adjust in response to the fall in q,i td o e sn o t .
Therefore, the relative wage of women and men is unchanged. Again, this is in contrast to what is
seen in the data. This is shown in Figure 3B.
Figure 3C shows the time path for expenditure shares on home capital. In contrast to the
data, this share increases signiﬁcantly and stays high.
21In sum, the prediction of the model is that in response to the change in the price of durables,
hours in the home stay roughly unchanged, as do human capital investment decisions. There is
a dramatic increase in k2, however, mirroring the discussion of our simple example. This can be
thought of as an increase in either the quantity or the quality of the durables used to produce home
goods.
Sensitivity Analysis
Table 3 displays the numerical results for the example discussed above (in the second row
of numbers) along with the results of several other related experiments. The third row of Table
3 shows the results for an example with even less substitution, ψ2 = −4. In this case, married
women’s hours increase more, by 3.2 hours per week, but still signiﬁcantly less than the 14.5 hours
per week in the data. For married men, the change is 0.8 hours per week, similar in magnitude
to the 0.5 hours seen above, while in the data the corresponding change is 3.0 hours. Not shown
in the table are the results of experiments based on more inclusive notions of home capital goods.
Since in those experiments, the corresponding reduction in q is smaller, even smaller changes in
hours result.
An alternative way of studying the impacts of improvements of technologies in the home is to
study the eﬀects of increases in A2 over and above any general technical change. However, in order
for this to have a chance at being successful, it is necessary that preferences deviate substantially
from the power utility case. In the power utility case, an increase in A2
t,t os a y ˆ A2
t =( 1+γ)A2
t,
raises home consumption by a factor γ but leaves all other variables, including hours of work,
unchanged.7 This theoretical result implies that, by continuity, changes in the home technology for
any speciﬁcation of preferences near unitary elasticity of substitution between home and market
goods must necessarily result in a small eﬀect on hours. As such, it serves as a useful benchmark
for what follows.
Here, as above, we only investigate what happens when home and market goods are com-
plements since if they are substitutes, market hours actually fall. To generate the large changes
in hours worked by married women observed in U.S. data, we are forced to examine very large
22changes in the value of A2. The results are displayed in Table 3. Again, with ψ2 = −0.75, the size
of the change in A2 that is needed to match the data is to increase it from A2 =1 .0t oA2 =5 .0,
over and above our benchmark level of technological change. With our benchmark growth rate in
the market sector of γA = 2%, this corresponds to a growth rate in home productivity of over 5%
per year while market productivity grows at only 2% per year.
Although this simulation matches the hours data well, with only a small change by singles,
it has three problems. First, for this story to be successful, home and market goods must be
complements, contrary to best estimates. Second, very large changes in technology are required
o v e ra n da b o v et h o s em e a s u r e di nm a r k e tp r o d u c t i v i t i e s .F i n a l l y ,e v e ni nt h e s ec a s e s ,w es e eo n l y
small eﬀects on the observed wage gap. This last point is important since it is directly related to
changes in human capital formation decisions, and as pointed out above, there seems to have been
a dramatic shift in the schooling decisions of men and women in the last 50 years.
Our results contrast with those of Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu (2002). There are
two key diﬀerences between our studies. First, Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu assume that
the labor supply decision is indivisible. Thus, married women are prevented from working part-
time. This implies that the elasticity of substitution between home and market goods plays no role
in their model. If a household is suﬃciently productive then a decrease in the price of a durable
that results in adoption on the part of a household frees up time–the technology is Leontief–that
can only be used to produce either market goods or leisure.
Second, since Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu assume that the home technology is
Leontief, and there are only two options for producing in the home, utility eﬀectively exhibits
satiation in the home good in their formulation. This seems to be why their model predicts that
eventually married women’s participation will begin to fall and durables expenditures decline as a
fraction of GDP. As we shall see in the next section, this is the driving force behind their results.
236. Inferiority of the Home Good
Another explanation for the observed change in married women’s hours is that the home
good is inferior. This, when accompanied by overall income growth, can cause married women’s
home hours to fall, freeing up time for more work in the market. In a static setting, a change in
income could cause relatively more eﬀort to be directed at obtaining market goods and relatively
less at home goods. This suggests that observed changes in hours might be due to income growth
as seen in the United States in the presence of inferiority of the home good. This is the hypothesis
we study in this section.
We examine two variations on the model above, where the utility function includes inferiority
of the home good. The functional forms that we examine are





(ψ1(c1)ψ2 +( 1− ψ1)(c2)ψ2)(1−ψ3)/ψ2 if c2 <c ∗
(ψ1(c1)ψ2 +( 1− ψ1)(c∗)ψ2)(1−ψ3)/ψ2 if c2 >c ∗
with U = 1
1−σ[(Vi(c1,c 2))1−ψ3(1 −  1 −  2)ψ3]1−σ, i =1 ,2. Thus, when α =1 ,V1 is like our
benchmark model, but when α<1, the function is more concave in the home good than in the
market good. The utility function V2 is even more extreme with strict satiation in the home good.
We also examine two diﬀerent sources of increases in wealth: trend growth in productivity
and reductions in prices of capital goods. (The latter also induces important substitution eﬀects.)
Results
What we ﬁnd is that speciﬁcations like that in V1 are not successful, no matter what the
source of income growth is. This was true no matter how small we make α.I t d o e s n o t m a t t e r
whether the source of growth is technological change overall or speciﬁct os o m eo ra l lo ft h ec a p i t a l
goods in the model. In all cases, the change in married women’s labor supply is inconsequential.
Whether speciﬁcations like those in V2 work or not depends critically on the choice of c∗.
There is a delicate balancing act: If c∗ is chosen too low, home hours fall for all households, including
24singles, while market hours increase. This is not what we see in the data. But if c∗ is too large,
there is no eﬀect on the market hours of any of the households. There is a range of values for c∗,
such that there is a large eﬀect on married couples, but only a small eﬀect on singles.
The hours series for one such example are shown in Figure 4A. Here, we assume that capital
prices are unchanged, but overall productivity grows as in our benchmark parameterization. The
increase in both married women’s hours and those of married men line up quite well with the data.
T h es a m ei st r u ef o rs i n g l e s ,b o t hw o m e na n dm e n .
There are three weaknesses of the example, however. Primarily, it requires exactly the right
speciﬁcation of satiation (i.e., c∗) to match the facts. It is diﬃcult to know whether or not this
speciﬁcation is realistic, and we know of no independent way of corroborating it. Another weakness
is that although the hours data match up well, even this extreme version only captures about
one-fourth of the observed change in the wage gap (Figure 4B). Finally, as one might guess, one
implication that comes along with this speciﬁcation is that the share of home investment goods
in output drops drastically, by a factor of more than 3. Figure 4C shows the time series from the
model along with that in the data, where the share in output is roughly constant over time.
Sensitivity Analysis
We conduct numerous sensitivity analyses of the examples described above in an attempt to
isolate the relative contributions of diﬀerent sources of income growth and preference speciﬁcation.
What we ﬁnd is that the eﬀect of any of the sources of income growth produce only small eﬀects
when the utility function is of the type in V1. In contrast, when utility is given by the form in V2,
durables prices alone produce almost no eﬀect without overall growth in productivity. Similarly,
when durable price reductions are added to the model with productivity growth, again, the marginal
eﬀect is quite small. Thus, we conclude that any eﬀect that is present with this speciﬁcation is only
present when we have both strict satiation and overall productivity growth. The declining price of
durables seems to play only a minor role.
257. Female-Male Wage Diﬀerentials
In this section, we study the impact of changes in measures of sex-speciﬁc distortions–given
by (1 −τdt)=( 1−τ ft)/(1−τ mt)–on labor supply decisions. There is substantial evidence that,
even controlling for a number of measurable characteristics, women’s wages are lower than men’s.
(See, for example, Goldin (1990), Blau and Kahn (1997) and Blau (1998).) Moreover, the data
indicate that this gap has been narrowing in the last few years.
Given the speciﬁcation that we have chosen, it follows that the gap in wages of women
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Hence, this gap is made up partly from the direct eﬀects of the distortion τdt and partly from the
indirect eﬀects of diﬀerent human capital accumulation decisions.
Recall that in the U.S. data, wft/wmt has risen from about 56% in 1969 to about 72% in 1994.
If all relevant skills (i.e., h and η) were perfectly measured and controlled for we would have direct
measures of both the level and the change in 1−τdt that must have occurred over this time period.
If, however, h represents skills measured by the econometrician (years of schooling, for example),
while η represents other skills that are not adequately measured (ability to use spreadsheet software,
for example), and if these unmeasured skills diﬀer systematically by sex, then wft/wmt would be
an overestimate of 1 −τdt. Moreover, the change in wft/wmt w o u l db ea no v e r e s t i m a t eo ft h et r u e
change in discrimination if ηf/ηm increases when τd falls.
We study a version of the model in which the series τdt is calibrated so that the model and
the data values for the relative wages of women and men match. This series necessarily requires that
the value of τdt fall over the time period. To match the observed series of relative wages, we assume
a tax rate on women of τ ft =0 .40 in 1950 (for comparison, recall that τ mt =0 .23) and we assume
that this falls to τ ft =0 .35 by 1995, where it stabilizes.8 This gives an initial discrimination tax
of τd1950=1−(1−τ f 1950)/(1−τ m1950)=0 .22, and a ﬁnal value of τd1995 =0 .16. Since we do not
have a direct measure of the τdt series, we will conduct considerable experimentation on it below.
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Figure 5B shows the time path of relative wages as given by Blau (1998) along with that
calculated from our model. The predictions of the model for the number of hours worked and the
comparable values for the United States are presented in Figure 5A. The model prediction matches
the long-run behavior of hours worked very accurately, both the change from steady state to steady
state and the path over the last 50 years. In particular, the model generates both the large increase
by married women and the small decrease by married men that are in the data. There is also
virtually no response by single women to the same change in discrimination over the period from
1950 to 1990. Thus, large changes in discrimination are not needed to mimic the behavior of hours
worked by women and men. Indeed, the time path of hours in the data is exactly what one would
expect from a relatively small change in discrimination.
Two features of the model are, however, at odds with the data. The hours series from the
model for single men is systematically too high throughout the 1950—1990 period. And the model
outcome for single men shows a small but signiﬁcant downward trend while in the data, these hours
are U-shaped.
The small change in market hours for singles over the 1950—1990 period that the model
generates is in keeping with the discussion of the static model in Section 2. Thus, the qualitative
behavior predicted there with logarithmic preferences continues to hold (approximately) in this
dynamic setting even though the static elasticity of substitution between home and market goods
is 1.67 and not 1.
The fact that hours in home production are roughly equal for single women and single men
and constant over the experiment is directly reﬂected in the time paths for home consumption
which are also roughly equal and quite stable. This is also in keeping with the static example.
Although it is not shown here, the behavior of market consumption is more complex. Over
time, single women’s market consumption rises roughly in step with the reduction in eﬀective
labor tax rates over the period, a prediction of the static model. However, that is not true for
the relationship between single women’s and single men’s market consumption. Here, the static
27model would suggest that the ratio of market consumptions between the two types of single agents
would be equal to the ratio of their tax rates. In fact, single women consume less than this. The
main reason for this is that the existence of discrimination induces a diﬀerence in human capital
investment which exaggerates the diﬀerences in wages and hence, the diﬀerences in consumption.
This is a purely dynamic eﬀect of discrimination.
Is the increase in married women’s hours in the market at the cost of hours spent in leisure
or in home production? As it turns out, the answer to this is both–about 33% comes from reduced
leisure while 67% comes from reduced work in the home. Indeed, in part because of our assumption
that leisure for the two partners is equal in 1950, by 1990 married women are working outside the
home approximately 9 hours more per week in total than are married men.
As a ﬁnal point on the equilibrium hours series produced by the model, note that, as discrim-
ination is reduced, a married couple looks more and more like a single woman and single man. That
is, as can be seen in Figure 5A, although total market hours for a married couple are substantially
fewer than those for two singles at the beginning of the period (50 hours vs. 60 hours), they are
roughly the same by 1995. This is true in the data as well. This phenomenon is a by-product of
the reduced incentives for over-consumption of the home good as a tax avoidance strategy by the
married couple.
Since this version of the model is successful at matching the hours series, we are led to
examine its other predictions. One interesting feature of the model is its implications for decisions
on human capital investment. It predicts a substantial diﬀerence across the sexes in the investment
paths in human capital for both single and married agents. This is directly due to the increased
rate of return on human capital accumulation for the woman due to the forecast reduction in tax
rates she faces. The time paths for human capital for all agents are shown in Figure 6A. Over time,
the decrease in the gender wage gap induces women to invest more in human capital and less in
physical capital. Thus, a portfolio reallocation eﬀect is associated with changes in discrimination.
The predicted increases are substantial, over 172% for married women and 36% for single women.
Men’s investment also decreases somewhat (only relative to trend; the absolute level does not fall).
28As we will see, some versions of the model predict that human capital of single women will overtake
and pass that of single men about the time the discrimination tax hits zero. Interestingly, this is
similar to what has been seen recently; women’s college graduation rates in the United States have
now surpassed those of men. In contrast, in the versions of the model in Sections 5 and 6, the
changes in human capital by women are much smaller, with virtually no change in single women’s
stocks.
This change in human capital investment for women has implications for the composition
of the stock of wealth for all agents in the economy. For a married couple, the share of human
capital increases, while the share of physical capital decreases. This change is entirely internally
ﬁnanced by the couple, however, with virtually no change over the period in holdings of physical
capital. For single women, investment in physical capital decreases dramatically, becoming negative
eventually. This decrease, coupled with the increase in their investments in human capital, implies
a substantial change in the composition of their portfolio. Single men behave in the opposite way.
Thus, single women borrow in order to ﬁnance investment in human capital. In the model, this is
accomplished by a decrease in investment in physical capital. Single men are on the other side of
this market. For them, the rate of return on human capital has not increased, and they are willing
to lend to single women.
The change in the incentives for human capital accumulation is the property of the model
that drives the results on the paths of hours for women. As discrimination falls, wage rates for
women would rise even in the absence of any increase in investment. The increased investment
in human capital has two eﬀects: It increases the size of the wage change and it exaggerates the
increase in the cost of leisure for women over the period of transition. These two eﬀects induce
intertemporal substitution of leisure along the transition path. Consequently, women choose to
work relatively little early on and increase hours substantially over the period of transition.
The model also has implications for the marriage premium for both women and men. We
deﬁne the female (male) marriage premium as the ratio of hourly wages between married and single
women (men). These ratios are shown in Figure 6B. For men, the model predicts a reasonably large
29increase, wages of single men are about 3% less than married men in 1950, rising to 5% more by 2000
and remaining constant thereafter. In the data, this ratio is also fairly constant, but considerably
lower, with wages of single men about 20% below those of married men. As expected, the diﬀerences
in relative wages in the model are larger for women. In 1950, the ratio of wages of single women
t ot h o s eo fm a r r i e dw o m e ni s1 . 1 8 ,a n dt h er a t i of a lls smoothly over the time period, reaching its
steady-state level of 0.99 by 1990. In the data, the corresponding values are 1.15 for 1970 (which
is also the value from the model) and 1.02 for 1990. Thus, the model matches this feature of the
data fairly well.
Finally, the model has implications for the time path of productivity for the economy. Some
economists have argued that part of the productivity slowdown seen in the United States in the
1970s and early 1980s is due to the increase in women’s labor force participation. (See Baily (1986).)
The intuition is straightforward. Women have lower skill levels than their male counterparts due to
both discrimination and specialization. Thus, women’s participation increases and average labor
productivity falls. This argument misses the point that skill acquisition is endogenous, however.
The overall eﬀect then depends on which changes faster: women’s hours or their human capital.
The time path of overall labor productivity in the model does indeed fall relative to trend as this
argument suggests. (But in some parameterizations, it actually rises.) Thus, the view that the
observed path is due to increased participation by women is consistent with the model of reduced
discrimination against women. This also points out that the reduction in productivity relative to
trend may actually lead to a welfare improvement, at least for some groups.
Sensitivity Analysis
We turn now to the sensitivity of our results. Some of the modeling choices that we have
made are standard; they have counterparts in all dynamic models (e.g., discount factors and pref-
erence and production parameters). Others–the choice of welfare weights within a couple, the
speciﬁcation of eﬀective labor including human capital, the nature of the transfer scheme for dis-
tributing the revenue raised by the discrimination tax, and the assumption of equal discrimination
against married and single women–are unique to the questions that we are addressing. We ﬁnd
30that generally speaking, our results are robust to alternative speciﬁcations. The one exception to
this is the speciﬁcation in which discrimination aﬀects married women only; this example is diﬃcult
t om a t c hw i t ht h eo b s e r v e dw a g es e r i e s .
Table 4 reports hours of work, relative wages, and home investment shares for several alter-
native versions of the model. The ﬁrst row of numbers contains the U.S. data, and the remaining
rows display statistics for the diﬀerent model parameterizations, the ﬁrst being the benchmark
parameterization discussed above.
In our benchmark case, the weight on married women’s utility is low (λf =0 .062). As
indicated before, this is necessary in the benchmark example to keep total hours by the woman,
home plus market, at the same level as those of her partner. The ﬁrst experiment reported in Table
4 assumes a higher weight on women’s utility–the same, in fact, as that on married men’s. In order
to match the wage series for this parameterization, a larger change in τd is required. (See Table 2.)
In this experiment, we assume that τd2000 =0 .12; hence, the reduction is still a relatively modest
10%. Given this, however, the changes in hours are similar to those in the benchmark model.
In a second experiment, we consider a variation of the model with no human capital. Here,
we set κi and ζi, i =1 ,2, equal to 0.001 so that the return to human capital is negligible. All other
parameters are as in the benchmark example except for the path of τd,w h i c hb e g i n sa tτd1950 =0 .48
and falls to τd2000 =0 .22 as is required to match the wage series. In this case, it follows that the gap
is simply the wedge introduced by the discrimination tax. There is no additional wedge introduced
by human capital diﬀerences. The smaller gap means that larger changes in discrimination are
required to match the relative wage series, but beyond this, the results of the experiment are quite
similar to the benchmark case. Thus, the role of human capital is quantitatively signiﬁcant, in that
with human capital included, only a 6% drop in τd is required while without it, a drop of 26% is
needed.
Also included in Table 4 are two further experiments on the role of human capital. In one,
we assume that human capital is useful only in the market sector. In the other, we assume that
the two types of human capital are sector-speciﬁc. The results are similar for all variations, with
31the exception of the path τd required to mimic the gender wage gap.
For the simulations discussed so far, we have assumed that revenues from the discrimination
tax are lump-sum rebated in an equal per capita fashion. An alternative hypothesis is that the
revenue raised from discrimination against women is used to subsidize some other group of agents.
To analyze this possibility, we simulate a speciﬁcation in which the revenues generated from the
discrimination tax are used as a subsidy to married men (Goldin (1990, p. 102)). The parameters
of the model are recalibrated so as to match initial hours and the time path of the wage gap.
From this, we ﬁnd that similar changes in the discrimination tax give nearly identical results as
our benchmark simulation does.
The benchmark simulation assumes that there is equal discrimination against both married
and single women. In fact, many of the discriminatory practices that have been documented (e.g.,
marriage bars; see Goldin (1990)) seem to exhibit more discrimination against married women than
single ones. Because of this, we consider an example in which we set the discriminatory taxes for
single women equal to zero, with the other parameters held ﬁxed at their benchmark levels. This
experiment is the last row in Table 4. Here, we can ﬁnd no time path for τd that replicates the
time series of the gender wage gap. Hence, we use the path from our benchmark parameterization.
We ﬁnd that this change signiﬁcantly increases the relative wage of women in all periods (0.68 in
the model now as opposed to 0.56) and leads to more market hours for all groups except married
males. There is still a substantial change in married women’s market hours from the reduction in
discrimination, however, from 11.2 to 22.8 hours per week.
In sum, the results reported in our benchmark example seem to be fairly robust to both
changes in the parameters and the details of the treatment of the discrimination tax. As long as
the levels and changes in τd are chosen so as to match the observed path of the gender wage gap,
t h et i m es e r i e sf o rh o u r sm a t c h e st h ed a t a .T h es i z ea n dt h ec h a n g eo fτd that is needed for this
depends critically on the role of human capital, however.
328. Conclusions
In this paper we have examined three alternative hypotheses for the change over the 1950-90
period in married female labor supply. These are: i) that the change is a result of improvements
in the technology for producing home goods, ii)t h a ti tf o l l o w sf r o mo v e r a l li n c o m eg r o w t hi fh o m e
goods are inferior, and iii) that it is a result of a reduction in the gender wage gap. Our results show
that improvements in home technologies are not succesful in accounting for the data. Some extreme
forms of home good inferiority (satiation) do have limited success, but these forms bring with them
a host of other, counterfactual, predictions. We ﬁnd that a reduction in the gender wage gap is the
most successful of the three. Since one possible reason for the observed change in the gender wage
gap is a reduction in discrimination against women, our ﬁndings are consistent with the view that
this is the driving force. Due to limitations in both the model and the data, however, our results
are also consistent with changes in the gender wage gap coming from sex speciﬁci m p r o v e m e n t si n
market productivity.
Changes in the wage gap do not have large eﬀects on singles given a speciﬁcation in which
income and substitution eﬀects cancel each other. This characterizes the situation of both single
women and single men. However, for partnerships there is another margin in which the partners
can move: endogenous specialization allows married women to partially avoid the discrimination
tax. Thus, changes in the gap between women’s and men’s wages induce substantial reallocations
within the family, even though overall changes in the level of wages have a small impact on labor
supply. This implies that married women respond to changes in discrimination by substantially
changing their market hours.
Our results suggest that changes in the rate of productivity growth in the home production
sector are not as successful in explaining the U.S. historical experience for two reasons. First,
for hours of married women to increase, we need to assume that market and home goods are
complementary, in contrast with the best estimates. Second, even in this case, to match the
increases in the number of hours worked by married women, the model requires exceptionally large
increases in the productivity of household activities. The impact of the declining relative price
33of home capital is found to be relatively minor, with the model predicting that this will be met
with increases in the quantity and quality of home production. Similarly, stories based on the
inferiority of home goods face diﬃculties. Even with the extreme versions of this speciﬁcation
that are needed to match the hours pattern, the model produces counterfactual predictions about
expenditure shares on home durables. It also has diﬃculty in tracking the observed pattern of the
gender wage gap.
We view our model of a time-changing discrimination tax as a ﬁrst step. We have ignored the
eﬀects of uncertainty about returns to human capital and the permanence of marriage (divorce). In
addition, we have taken the decision to form partnerships as exogenous. In ongoing work we study
both the impact of uncertainty about marital status on accumulation decisions and the eﬀects of
endogenizing the marriage decision. We conjecture that including these features will not change the
basic conclusions we have reached here, but will improve the model’s overall ﬁt, especially for the
behavior of single households. This is because much of what is at odds with the data in the current
version of the model comes from intertemporal trading between single women and men conducted
under the assumption that marital status will not change. When this is no longer true, we expect
that the predicted downward trend in single men’s hours (for example) will largely disappear.
34Appendix: Glass Ceilings and Job Choice
In this appendix, we develop a simple model of job restrictions that are sex speciﬁca n d
show that this is equivalent to the sex-speciﬁct a xτd described in the main text.
There is a continuum of job types, indexed by s ∈ S ⊂ R+. Each agent chooses one and
only one job. There is an inelastic supply of hours, which is set without loss of generality at 1 per
person. We assume that the relative productivity of a person working in job type s is ϕ(s). Thus,





T h u s ,aw o r k e rw o r k i n gi naj o bo ft y p es earns the wage w(s)=ϕ(s)F (k,
R
S ϕ(x)n(x)dx).
Suppose that the disutility of working in a job of type s is given by v(s). Then, the problem
for a typical male worker facing tax rate τ is given by
max
s (1 − τ)ϕ(s)F  − v(s).
The optimal choice of job for this male, sm,s a t i s ﬁes
(1 − τ)F ϕ0(sm)=v0(sm).
If v is more convex than ϕ, it follows that the job type is decreasing in the tax rate, s0
m(τ) < 0.
Female workers solve the same problem except they face a constraint on their job choice,
s ≤ ¯ s.S i n c ev is more convex than ϕ, this constraint binds as long as ¯ s<s m and hence the solution
to the female worker’s problem is sf =¯ s.D e ﬁne τd as that wedge for which an unconstrained female
would choose job type ¯ s, i.e.,
(1 − τd)(1 − τ)F ϕ0(¯ s)=v0(¯ s).
Thus, the occupational choice facing a glass ceiling restriction is exactly the same as the choice the
female worker would make if there were no restriction but she faced a higher tax rate.
35Notes
1Alternatively, k can be interpreted as the quality of an indivisible durable good that the
household purchases. Under this interpretation, higher quality durables provide more services and
cost correspondingly more, with the slope of the price/quality tradeoﬀ given by q. All results below
concerning a reduction in q a r et h e ni n t e r p r e t e da ss h i f t i n gt h ee n t i r ec u r v ed o w ni nap r o p o r t i o n a l
fashion. Similar results are obtained when the cost of a durable of type k is given by qkς with
ς>1, and q is lowered.
2Note that the results given here continue to hold even if the share parameters are diﬀerent
between the types of agents. For example, if νfs >ν ms, single women will devote more hours to
the production of home goods than will single men. Even in this more general case, changes in
technology will not aﬀect overall hours devoted to market activities by these two groups.
3From a formal point of view, the excess revenue of the tax imposed on female hours needs
to be allocated. In our model, we rebate these amounts to the agents in the economy in a lump
sum fashion. The last term, Tpt, captures these transfers in addition to any excess revenue over
and above government purchases of goods and services. We do some experimentation with this
expenditure rule in our sensitivity analysis.
4We had diﬃculty matching the 1950 hours for all four groups and the transitional path of
relative wages in our benchmark simulations.
5It is diﬃcult to know how large the eﬀects of human capital should be in the model. For
example, under the assumption that logh = Ed, the number of years of education, and logη = Exp,
the number of years of experience, the estimates from Mincer-style regressions of κ1 are around
0.10, while those of ζ1 are around 0.05, or about .15 in total. (See Bils and Klenow (2000).) These
v a l u e sa r el o w e rt h a nt h o s ew eu s ei no u rs i m u l a t i o n .O nt h eo t h e rh a n d ,i fw ei n s t e a da s s u m et h a t
h = Ed, the number of years of education, and η = Exp, the corresponding estimate of κ1+ ζ1 is
near one. Thus, our parameterization lies between these two extremes.
6This type of change is equivalent to a formulation with a multisector model with each
producing a diﬀerent market good, but with the same CRS production function and sector speciﬁc
changes in that technology.
7The proof is as follows. For any allocation z = {zt},l e tˆ z = {ˆ zt} be the allocation in which
the term corresponding to consumption of nonmarket goods is increased by (1 + γ). Let x be the
initial equilibrium, and let Uf = Um = 1
1−σ[((c1)ψ1(c2)1−ψ1)(1−ψ3)(1 −  1 −  2)ψ3]1−σ. Consider
the problem solved in equilibrium by a married couple. Holding prices ﬁxed, note that holding all
quantities other than c2
gp,t ﬁxed, the set of feasible choices is homogeneous of degree one in c2
gp,t.
Thus, ˆ x is a feasible allocation. Given the speciﬁcation of the utility function, the value of the
problem–denoted V (x)–is such that V (ˆ x)=( 1+γ)ηV (x), where η =( 1−ψ1)(1−ψ3)(1−σ). We
want to show that ˆ x is maximal in the budget set. Suppose not, and let ˆ y = {ˆ yt} be a preferred
36allocation that is feasible. Then scaling down the c2
gp,t coordinate of ˆ y makes the allocation feasible
under the original budget set. Let this scaled-down allocation be denoted by y. Then it follows that
V (ˆ y)=( 1+γ)ηV (y). Thus, we have the following inequalities: V (ˆ y)=( 1+γ)ηV (y) >V(ˆ x)=
(1 + γ)ηV (x), which implies that V (y) >V (x). This contradicts our assumption that x was
maximal in the original budget set. To complete the argument, note that under the ˆ x allocation,
none of the market quantities change; hence, the original prices still clear all the markets. The
problems solved by single women and single men are handled similarly.
8The exact sequence of tax rates we use is: .4, .397, .394, .392, .389, .386, .383, .375, .368,
.360, .353, .353, .... Note that this implies a fairly slow reduction in discrimination between 1950
and 1975 with an acceleration occurring after that.
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40Table 1. Benchmark Parameter Values
Description Symbol Benchmark Value
Fraction married 2np .6
Government tax rates & spending
Labor tax rate τ  .23
Capital tax rate τk .5
Government spending share G/F 1 .2
Annual growth rates
Population growth γp 1%
Technological growth γA 2%
Annual discount factor β 1.017
Capital share θ .22
Annual depreciation rates
Physical capital δk 8%
Type-h human capital δh 8%
Type-η human capital δη 8%
Preferences†
Weight on market consumption ψ1 .682
Market-home substitution parameter ψ2 .429
Weight on leisure ψ3 .557
Intertemporal substitution parameter σ 6.783
Weight on female in joint utility, λfUf + λmUm λf .062
Eﬀective market labor, z1 = hκ1ηζ1 1
Elasticity with respect to hκ 1 .243
Elasticity with respect to ηζ 1 .243
Eﬀe c t i v eh o m el a b o r ,z2 = hκ2ηζ2 2
Elasticity with respect to hκ 2 .166
Elasticity with respect to ηζ 2 .166
Initial discrimination tax τd1950 .22
† U(c1,c 2, )= 1
1−σ
·¡
ψ1(c1)ψ2 +( 1− ψ1)(c2)ψ2¢ (1−ψ3)
ψ2  ψ3
¸1−σTable 2. Numerical Experiments
Description Experiment Non-benchmark parameters
Cheaper Home Investment with q falls, q2000/q1950 = .23 τdt = .27
Moderate elasticity ψ2 = −.75
Larger elasticity ψ2 = −4
Improved Home Technology A2 rises, A2
2000/A2
1950 =5 ψ2 = −.75,λ f = .2,ψ 1 = .68,ψ 3 = .52,κ 1 = ζ1 = .097,κ 2 = ζ2 = .001
Inferior Home Goods c2 ≤ c∗ binds c∗ = .049
Fall in Discrimination with τd falls
Benchmark parameters τd2000/τd1950 = .72
Equal utility weights τd2000/τd1950 = .53 λf = .5,ψ 1 = .63,ψ 3 = .65,κ 1 = ζ1 = .23,κ 2 = ζ2 = .31
No human capital τd2000/τd1950 = .46 κi = ζi = .001,τ d,1950 = .48,ψ 1 = .71,ψ 3 = .45
Market-only human capital τd2000/τd1950 = .47 κ2 = ζ2 = .001,κ 1 = ζ1 = .047,τ d,1950 = .42,ψ 1 = .76,ψ 3 = .47
Sector-speciﬁc capital τd2000/τd1950 = .50 κ2 = ζ1 = .001,κ 1 = ζ2 = .1,τ d,1950 = .40,ψ 1 = .72,ψ 3 = .47
Married men subsidized τd2000/τd1950 = .50 ψ1 = .62,ψ 3 = .58,κ 1 = ζ1 = .24,κ 2 = ζ2 = .20
No singles discrimination τd2000/τd1950 = .72 τ ,fs = τ ,msT a b l e3 . E f f e c t so fC h a n g e si nH o m eT e c h n o l o g y ‡
1950 Results 1990 Results
Wage Wage Share,
Hours per Week Ratio Hours per Week Ratio Home Inv.
MF MM SF SM (%) MF MM SF SM (%) (1950=100)
Data 8.2 41.3 29.0 31.6 51 22.7 38.3 29.0 30.2 69 85
Models:
Cheaper Home Investment
with Moderate Elasticity 13.1 41.7 30.3 34.0 44 15.4 41.2 30.1 34.2 45 122
with Larger Elasticity 19.4 40.7 30.5 33.9 47 22.6 39.9 30.6 34.6 48 109
Inferior Home Goods 9.9 41.3 28.9 33.9 51 16.6 38.9 27.1 32.8 55 87
Improved Home Technology 5.5 39.9 27.1 27.6 59 22.7 38.1 30.8 32.2 68 76
Table 4. Effects of Fall in Discrimination‡
1950 Results 1990 Results
Wage Wage Share,
Hours per Week Ratio Hours per Week Ratio Home Inv.
MF MM SF SM (%) MF MM SF SM (%) (1950=100)
Data 8.2 41.3 29.0 31.6 51 22.7 38.3 29.0 30.2 69 85
Models:
Benchmark 8.0 41.1 28.0 34.1 51 21.5 36.9 30.0 31.7 69 95
Equal utility weights 8.2 41.3 27.1 32.8 52 17.1 39.3 30.0 30.9 68 98
No human capital 8.4 41.4 25.1 35.1 52 20.4 38.2 31.9 32.7 68 84
Market-only human capital 8.2 41.3 27.1 35.9 50 23.1 37.6 32.6 33.2 68 84
Sector-speciﬁc capital 8.2 41.3 27.9 35.9 51 22.7 37.6 32.8 33.4 68 84
Married men subsidized 8.0 41.1 27.3 33.2 51 19.3 38.4 30.8 30.1 68 94
No singles discrimination 10.0 41.1 34.2 34.2 69 22.6 37.7 32.7 32.7 82 96
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Predictions of Model with Falling Home Capital Price
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Predictions of Model with Inferior Home Goods













Predictions of Model with Changes in Discrimination
(Lines= model results, Dots= observations)
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C. Average Market Productivity Relative to Trend (1950=100)
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Auxiliary Predictions of Model with Discrimination